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Canada and the United States:
Dispute Settlement and
the International Joint Commission
- Can This Experience be Applied
to Law of the Sea Issues?
Maxwell Cohen*
The Problem
T HE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE on theLaw of the Sea,1 in light of the many issues on which it has
focused world attention for the past several years, has an impor-
tance for Canada and the United States that is multilateral as
well as bilateral. There are certain very specific Canadian-United
States problems which have led'to some serious differences, as well
as agreement, in perception and policy between these two neigh-
bors who share coastal concerns on the Atlantic, on the Pacific
and in the Arctic. These oceanic interests involve the debate over
the meaning in context and geography of proposed "economic
zones"; the breadth of the territorial sea and associated base-line
problems; the continental shelf-margin and lines to be drawn de-
fining the limits of national jurisdiction; rights of passage or transit
through straits, territorial seas and other varieties of narrow waters;
the scientific exploration of the ocean and its seabed within or
beyond the economic zone over which restrictive claims are being
made by coastal states; marine pollution and its control; and the new
sense of equity in the sharing with landlocked or developing states
the living and nonliving resources within the coastal seas or on
and in the shelf-margin seabed and subsoil of countries more
fortunate. All of these issues are important to Canada and the
* Chairman, International Joint Commission, Canadian Section; sometime
Dean of the Faculty of Law (1964-69) and Macdonald Professor of Law (on leave
of absence) McGill University; of the Bars of Qu6bec and Manitoba.
I For discussions of the sessions of the Conference to date see Stevenson &
Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974);
Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the
1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); Stevenson & Oxman, The Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 4 (1975).
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United States in the two countries' capacities as activist partici-
pants in the Third Law of the Sea Conference and as neighbors
who share some views, as well as disputes, among these central
issues before the Conference.
If one adds to these questions the odd but unsettling fact that
some boundary areas remain to be appropriately or finally deter-
mined between Canada and the United States, some of which
have important law of the sea aspects, 2 it is evident that the com-
plex of Canadian-United States interaction on oceanic claims and
concerns is another feature of the extraordinary interweaving of
interests and potential conflict that geography and history have
imposed upon the two neighbors.
Some of the oceanic problems and the related salt water boun-
dary problems could become divisive between the two countries if
appropriate steps are not taken to resolve them. Then, too, are
the questions concerning U.S. access to the Northwest Passage,
the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970,
3
the struggle for Canadian control of the cod fisheries in the area
of the Grand Banks off Newfoundland, the eastward seabed loca-
tion of the continental shelf margin line for determining Canadian
and United States claims, and the rights of passage through the
narrow and difficult waters on the New Brunswick-Maine coast in
the east and the British Columbia-Washington coast in the west. 4
In addition, the control of airborne and waterborne coastal marine
pollution flowing from the United States and Canadian land
mass, and from coastal and oceanic shipping are on the trouble-
some agenda as both countries seek to have a law of the sea
agreement that meets their national interests but does not, at the
same time, exacerbate the vital cooperative relations between
them. 5
2 For example, it has not yet been determined who owns Machias Seal Island
in the Bay of Fundy; or how to measure the continental shelf eastward through
George's Bank; or where the 'AB Line, running seaward, makes final the effects
of the Alaska Boundary Award on Dixon Entrance and Hecate Strait; or whether
the boundary between the U.S. and Canada in the Arctic shall, as they mark off
their respective continental shelf claims in the Beaufort Sea, follow a simple direct
sector extension northward to the pole or rest on a median line more favorable to
the United States.
3 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 1970, 18 & 19 Eliz. 2, c. 203.
4 The question arises whether passage is innocent where proposed oil tanker
routes pose substantial risks of accidental spills possibly causing long term eco-
logical damage.
I Canada-U.S. Treaty Relations, in Deener, Ed., (1964, Duke Univ. Press)
passim, for a review of all treaty relations from 1790-1960.
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These matters, difficult as they are, might be better viewed
from the perspective of the success that Canada and the United
States have had in settling their fresh water disputes along a com-
mon frontier running from Maine-New Brunswick to Yukon-
Alaska. The Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain
Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and
Canada6, which created the International Joint Commission, has
led to a unique record of dispute settlement experience7 which
today is essentially environmentally oriented, even though a much
simpler water use concept moved the treaty-makers three genera-
tions ago. 8
Given the global character of the new interdependence touch-
ing on all major international issues, but given also the particular
character of Canadian-United States relations and the special expe-
rience of the International Joint Commission, it might well be
asked whether the Commission provides a model for the settle-
ment of some pending Canadian-United States oceanic disputes,
particularly coastal ones, if and when the Third Law of the Sea
Conference produces principles in a final and binding instrument
or instruments. 9
This article, therefore, is designed to describe briefly the basis
of Canadian-United States relations and the experience of the
two countries under the Boundary Waters Treaty and with the
International Joint Commission. The reader is left to judge the
extent to which the concepts underlying the Treaty and the Com-
mission's work apply to salt water issues and the extent to which
they assist the two countries in seeking appropriate machinery for
managing disputes as they arise on the trinity of seas they share.
Canadian-United States Relations in a Global Context
Our times are full of contradictions and changes, with massive
global problems compelling new institutional arrangements. Na-
6 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters Between the United States and Canada, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548
(1909) [hereinafter cited as Boundary Waters Treaty].
I For a summary of the work of the International Joint Commission see L.
BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES (1959).
8 See, supra note 5, at 40-46.
9 For discussions of dispute settlement proposals at the Law of the Sea Con-
ference see Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Arising out of the Law of the Sea Convention,
12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495 (1975); and Adede, Settlement of Disputes Arising Under
the Law of the Sea Convention, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 798 (1975).
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tionalism, in varying degrees, now moves uneasily in tandem with
international and regional machinery. This is true not only in
the public sector represented by states, but also in the private
sector represented by multinational corporations. From this per-
spective each country becomes a decentralized arena dealing with
transnational problems of immense complexity. The world there-
fore needs both viable, innovative states (but not mini-states) and
viable, imaginative multinational institutions. The new interna-
tional economic order presents a further stage in the potential re-
construction of the international system. A subtle shifting over
time of varied balances may be among the most sophisticated chal-
lenges of modern international statesmanship. 10
Existing institutions range from global mechanisms with dif-
fering degrees of "clout" such as the UN family, to regional
machinery with great authority such as NATO, and regional ma-
chinery with little sanctioning power such as the Arab League.
Similarly, the movement toward establishing free trade areas and
extensive regional economic cooperation such as the European
Economic Community, the Central American Common Market
and the East African Community, demonstrates a strdng urge to
find transnational answers to common economic and technologi-
cal problems. In environmental matters, the same process is
taking place, from the Stockholm Conference of 197211 to the
present on-going Law of the Sea Conference, with the likelihood
that bilateral, regional and global institutions will emerge to
regulate or manage common marine, land, environmental and eco-
nomic interests.
One significant result of this institutionalizing process, in a po-
litical and formal sense, is to give symmetry to interstate relations
that would otherwise be heavily asymmetrical, thereby helping to
correct the distorted pattern of smaller powers versus greater pow-
ers.
Canadian-United States Institutions and the Founding of the
International Joint Commission
These global and regional institutions transcend Canadian-
United States bilateral relations: for example, globally from the
10 See e.g., the evidence of the Hon. Allan J. MacHeachen, Secretary of State
for External Affairs, before the Committee, June 10, 1975, Proceedings of the
Standing Committee, No. 16; see also the evidence of his predecessor, the Hon.
Mitchell Sharp in Proceedings Issue No. 1., March 28, 1974, at 5-19.
11 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in
Stockholm, Sweden from June 5 to 16, 1972.
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UN to the World Bank, and regionally from NATO in security
matters to ICNAF in fisheries.
Nevertheless, continental geographic imperatives have com-
pelled the fashioning of joint machinery reflecting the Canadian-
United States fact of physical neighborhood. Looking at the whole
of treaty relations between Canada (Britain) and the United States,
from the 1790's to date, there have been six periods in the evolu-
tion of treaty relations.12
Generally, treaty relations did not give rise to permanent in-
stitutions until recent times. Rather, they provided generally for
bilateral problem-solving by promulgating agreed rules on which
negotiation and diplomacy could be founded, or rules upon which
the courts of both countries could act if necessary, for example,
with respect to extradition and taxation. But they left many gray
areas such as failure to clarify through treaty the effect of United
States laws on Canada. 13
The growth of a bilateral, permanent mechanism which could
partly or wholly replace ad hoc negotiation, did not begin until the
International Waterways Commission was established in 1905.
That commission soon recognized its limitations since its work was
advisory and its jurisdiction limited. Disputes over the Niagara
River, over dry areas in the West around the St. Mary and Milk
Rivers, as well as problems emerging at the Sault in the outflow
from Lake Superior into Huron, all encouraged thinking about the
need for a more permanent method of resolving these and other
disputes in the longest, most complex water boundary and trans-
boundary waterway system in the world. 14
These considerations offered an inviting opportunity for creating
a permanent institution to manage in a comprehensive way water
sharing, use, levels and flows affecting each country. The U.S.
position was self-contradictory in the 1907-to-1909 negotiation al-
though agreement finally was reached with concessions on both
sides. Originally, the United States did not want such compre-
hensive authority delegated to a permanent commission. The
Canadians did not want the U.S. Harmon Doctrine claiming
absolute rights of diversion by the upstream sovereign of water on
12 Canada-U.S. Treaty Relations, supra note 5, passim.
13 Such extraterritorial effects may even be violations of international law, for
example, where the United States attempts to apply its penal and fiscal laws
directly or indirectly to Canadian corporations or citizens, or to United States
nationals permanently residing in Canada: see also Sharp, supra note 10, at 6-9.
14 Second Interim Report of the Canadian Section and First Joint Report of
the International Waterways Commission, Ottawa, 1906, passim.
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either side of the line in a transboundary lake or river. However,
the United States was, at that time, ideologically favorable to
both arbitration and third-party intervention and was accustomed
to the technique of having public hearings before U.S. regulatory
agencies made decisions. These views influenced U.S. advocacy
for something similar to be included in the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909. t5 Finally, the Treaty appears to be the last great
Imperial Treaty signed by the United Kingdom on behalf of
Canada, although negotiated essentially by Canadians. The
Treaty has important constitutional significance for Canada to-
day, since it permits the exercise of some federal jurisdiction over
otherwise provincially-owned resources such as boundary and
transboundary rivers and lakes.' 6
Not until the Halibut Fisheries of Northern Pacific and Bering
Sea Treaty of 1930,17 the first truly Canadian treaty, did a second
Canadian-U.S. joint agency, the International Pacific Halibut
Commission, come into operation.18 Thereafter a series of more.or
less permanent institutions gradually emerged. These can be clas-
sified in different ways and some perhaps do not deserve to be
regarded as "institutions." From the point of view of managing
a joint operation with permanent joint secretaries, there appears to
be one group of only six such agencies, with a second group of
five having less of a specifically joint, united, operational mech-
anism. The range of most of these institutions is essentially
technical. There is, of course, a third group that is primarily
political in objective with annual or intermittent meetings and with-
out "permanent" secretariats, namely the Inter Parliamentary
Group and the two Ministerial Committees on Joint Defence,
and on Trade and Economic Affairs. 19
15 Note 6 supra.
16 Dreisziger, The International Joint Commission of the United States and
Canada (Unpublished thesis, 1974, Royal Military College, Kingston, Ont.) Vol.
1, 50-127.
17 Convention between the United States of America and the Dominion of
Canada for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of Northern Pacific Ocean and
Bering Sea, 47 Stat. 1873, T.S. No. 837 (1930).
18 The International Boundary Commission of 1910 is, of course, an exception.
19 See Cohen, Canada and the United States - Possibilities for the Future, 12
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 196 (1973); a more recent listing of "institutions" by
Profs. Holsti and Levy of British Columbia and Dalhousie Universities is to be
found in their paper on bilateral Canadian-United States institutions published in
the autumn of 1974 in a special number on Canada and the United States in the
Quarterly Journal, International Organization; see the list attached to Mr. Sharp's
evidence, supra note 10, at 35-39, presumably replacing the Holsti-Levy list; the
Department of External Affairs' analysis of these institutions, entitled "Canadian
[Vol. 8: 69
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The significance of this grouping is to demonstrate the gen-
erally limited character of permanent Canadian-U.S. institutions
despite the immense network of trade, investment, resource, immi-
gration, culture, security and other intertwinings that mark the
frontier dealings of the two countries. 2°  In this setting the In-
ternational Joint Commission appears to be the most advanced ef-
fort to approach the concept and practice of common fact-finding,
recommendations, quasi-management and judgment-making in
very significant areas of mutual national interests.21
The International Joint Commission and
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
There are several significant features of the Treaty22 and of
the Commission itself:
(a) the Commission's power to make orders binding on both
countries, controlling the building of any structure affect-
ing levels and flows, guided by certain priorities, with nav-
igation being a special case; 23
(b) public hearings dealing with Orders of Approval and
References, with provisions in Orders for indemnification
and protection of injured interests; 24
(c) the pioneer anti-pollution provisions;2s
(d) the wide range of investigative jurisdiction of "any other
questions"26 (known as "References");
(e) the so-far unused power to adjudicate "any questions";27
(f) the significant absence of treaty amendments, except
for the Niagara 28 and new agreements dealing with Lake
Governmental Instruments for Conducting Relations with the United States," and
dated October 9, 1969, did not seem to list the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission
of 1955 or a number of other agencies set out in the Holsti-Levy list.
20 No reference is here made to Province-State relations or modalities.
21 This is the view of the Senate Report, supra note 5, at 40-42, particularly at
40.
22 Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada in Force between His Majesty
and the United States of America, Br. T.S. 1910, No. 23 (Ottawa, 1927).
23 Boundary Waters Treaty, arts. III, IV, VIII.
24 Id. art. VIII; "Orders of Approval" refers. to the express approval that
must be given by the Commission before groups from either country may engage
in activities that would affect topical or geographical areas covered by the treaty.
25 Boundary Waters Treaty, art. IV.
26 Id. art. IX. Either country may initiate a Reference, but in practice both
agree to the terms.
27 Id. art. X.
28 Uses of Waters of the Niagara River, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 694, T.I.A.S. No. 2130.
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of the Woods,29 Rainy Lake,3° and Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement of 1972.31
The structure of the Commission, three Canadian and three
U.S. Commissioners, provides for parity of membership. How-
ever, the Commission acts as a unitary body, with the Canadian
and U.S. sections having been established, with offices in Ottawa
and Washington, only for necessary organizational purposes.
Symmetry in the Commission offsets the political asymmetry re-
sulting from differences, in sheer size between the U.S. and Can-
ada. 32  Similarly, all boards in the field, control, investigation,
monitoring or surveillance, operate on the basis of parity of mem-
bership. 33 All board members are appointed by the Commission
as a whole and all boards owe responsibility collegially to the
International Joint Commission.M
The two main aspects of the Commission's work, in a formal
sense, have been Orders of Approval for water uses affecting
levels and flows along the boundary waters or waters crossing
the boundary; References affecting levels, flows or pollution
with Recommendations to Governments, and investigations into
other subjects of a controversial nature such as Point Rob-
erts along the British Columbia-Washington boundary and the
possibility of Passamaquoddy power. 35 The "track record" on ac-
ceptance of Recommendations is very good. In the case of these
References only three Recommendations have not been accepted or
implemented, and only two boards have been divided in their
final report along national lines. The record of the semi-judicial
role of the Commission is significant in the general unanimity
with which its binding Orders have been reached. Only four
29 Boundary: Lake of the Woods-Lake Superior, 44 Stat. 2102, T.S. No. 720
(1925); Level of Lake of the Woods, 44 Stat. 2108, T.S. No. 721 (1925).
30 Level of Rainy Lake, 54 Stat. 1800, T.S. No. 961, 6 Bevans 115 (1938).
31 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, [1972] 1 U.S.T. 302, T.I.A.S. No.
7312 (1972).
32 See Evidence to the Senate Standing Committee of Maxwell Cohen,
Canadian Chairman, No. 16 (1975), supra note 5.
33 See Appendix I1, infra.
34 Members of the Lake of the Woods Board and the St. Mary-Milk Board
are appointed by the two governments.
35 Copies of the Point Roberts Reference, 1971, and the Passamaquoddy
Power Reference, 1948, can be obtained from the International Joint Commission,
1717 H St. N.W., Rm. 200, Washington D.C. 20440.
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decisions by the Commission in its Orders of Approval have led
to dissenting opinions or a divided Commission.
Viewed in terms of historical and functional development the
International Joint Commission has gone through four stages:
(a) the period of shaping the work of the Commission, from
1912 to the beginning of World War II, when applications
for Orders of Approval and References on pollution, and
water levels and flow defined the general pattern;
(b) the "great works" period of post-World War II, expressed
in the St. Lawrence Power and Seaway Orders of Ap-
proval of 1952 and 1956, 36 and the Columbia River Ref-
erence of 1944 completed in 1959, 37 which laid the basis
for the Columbia River Treaty in 1961 and 1964;38
(c) the gradual shift away from Orders of Approval to Ref-
erences after 1956 as the principal work of the Commis-
sion such as the Great Lakes Levels, pollution on
the Lower Lakes and connecting channels, the several Air
Pollution References, and more recently the Garrison
Diversion Reference;
(d) the growing importance of air pollution and water quality
problems and the emergence of an increasingly environmen-
tal perspective from 1960 onwards, culminating in the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 197239 and the Air
Pollution References of 1972,40 and 1975.
Some Observations on the Present Administration and
Operations of the Commission
The present staff at headquarters in both Washington and Ot-
tawa number five and six officers in each section respectively and
hopefully will reach 10 in Canada by mid 1976.41
Twenty-eight boards in the field 42 depend on the substantive
36 Copies of the order can be obtained from the address in note 35 supra.
37 Id.
38 Columbia River Basin; Cooperative Development of Water Resources,
U.S. and Canada, Jan. 17, 1961, with related agreements signed Jan. 22 and Sept.
16, 1964, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
39 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S. and Canada, [1972] 1 U.S.T.
302, T.I.A.S. No. 7312.
40 Copies can be obtained from the address in note 35 supra.
41 For Manpower and Budget of the Commission see Appendix I.
42 See Appendix II, infra.
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departments for membership and the financing of their operations.
Excellent cooperation from these departments and three genera-
tions of U.S. and Canadian public servants have worked jointly
to create a broad pool of cooperating talent in both countries.
The effect of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of
1972, 43 with its two Boards, two Groups and one Regional Office,
on the future work pattern of the Commission, suggests responsibil-
ities for the International Joint Commission amounting to almost
quasi-management but with no final or binding authority in the
Commission except the power to make recommendations and pub-
licize its views at all times. This power or practice has not yet
been made applicable to other reports of the Commission under the
Boundary Waters Treaty itself, although the Commission proba-
bly has the authority to amend its own present rules providing for
publication only with the consent of both governments.
Conclusions
In a time of considerable destabilization in Canadian-United
States relations with frequent irritation and occasional confronta-
tion, the International Joint Commission is doubtless a stabilizing
influence.
To test this proposition, imagine the condition of Canadian-
United States relations if each river basin, boundary air problem,
or land use as it affects water quality and air quality along the com-
mon frontier were to be dealt with ad hoc through adversary nego-
tiations. To this should be added the growing importance of fresh
water needs for all economic and environmental purposes over the
years to come, affecting both countries along the common frontier
and elsewhere.
The evolving role of the International Joint Commission is
increasingly in dealing with complex environmental and develop-
mental imperatives along the common frontier. This is due to the
powerful binational reciprocal interest in their solution through
parity of membership and a long tradition of effective coopera-
tion, using sound symmetrical and unitary machinery already in
place to resolve them. Three generations of engineers and other
skilled personnel from both countries have molded together in an
unusual record of successful cooperation.
Does this mean that the use of peer technicians, under some
institutional umbrella, equal in number and skill, who are appointed
by and responsible to that unitary umbrella agency, is a method
applicable to other areas of Canadian-United States relations?
43 See note 38 supra.
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How does it square with the new nationalism and the now chosen
"third option" of Canadian foreign policy which seeks some
wider, balancing relationships with Japan, China, the Pacific rim,
Latin America and the Common Market? There is room within
that option for exploring the applicability of this technique to other
areas of Canadian-United States issues whether it be under the
International Joint Commission umbrella or not. For the Com-
mission "technique" and its applicability to appropriate situations
have been amply demonstrated not only in the work of the Com-
mission itself, but also in the recent agreement which defines
procedures for agreeing annually upon Canadian-United States
balance of payment statistics.
The Boundary Waters Treaty is flexible enough to allow for
creative interpretation in the future. Ironically, in the present
Canadian-United States mood the Treaty probably could not be
even drafted today, to say nothing of being agreed upon by both
countries. Interpretations of legal principle and treaty language
by the Commission, designing new tasks for it by both governments
as in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, requests by both
countries for investigations involving a new awareness of the en-
vironmental-developmental complex such as the Garrison,
are all in effect now with no major changes in the core provisions
of the Treaty or in the core operating traditions of the Commission.
The common frontier is a geophysical fact, a special physical
relationship, however that concept is interpreted today. That
frontier unites the two c6untries in their search, through the Com-
mission, for common solutions to their boundary and transbound-
ary problems of water levels and supplies, water quality, air quality
and related land use problems. No one could have foreseen in
1909 this interacting complex of issues existing in 1976. Neither
can anyone foresee the further evolution of that complex in 1995.
But there must be the imagination to envisage the meaning of the
present for the on-going tasks of the future. For these reasons, the
Commission may have to have the capability of undertaking its
own preliminary inquiries wherever its emerging environmental-
developmental perspectives alert it to possible difficult issues
arising along the common frontier. It should have the power to
publicize its considered views on all matters of common interest,
as it now may do for the Great Lakes clean-up, power which is not
clearly present for its primary duties under the Boundary Waters
Treaty itself,44 although it could, if wisely managed, amend its own
rules accordingly.
44 These views are supported by the Canadian Senate Committee, supra note 5.
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Finally, nationalism as a source of social energy can be either
creative and constructive or negatively destructive. One of the
consequences of nurturing stabilizing instruments for dealing with
appropriate sectors of Canadian-United States relations is to
channel that energy towards imaginative and constructive yet
tough-minded and rational solutions rather than having chronic
confrontation for answering Canadian-United States problems.
Canada loses nothing by being firm on the level of equality af-
forded by parity of institutions instead of being aggressively angry
from a posture of inequality through the reality of differences in
sheer size. The United States would be wise to choose the road
of prior consultation and common fact-finding before undertaking
unilateral policies clearly damaging to Canada.
Is it desirable to envisage a similar approach, optionally but
not necessarily through the International Joint Commission, to
deal with law of the sea disputes between Canada and the United
States which negotiation, used as the primary tool, may have failed
to resolve? Coastal disputes, boundary and non-boundary, cer-
tainly seem worth considering as suitable subjects for common
fact-finding machinery on a permanent basis, to deal with future
Canadian-United States relations. For if facts cannot be com-
monly perceived and followed through to the same conclusions,
then the dispute will fester and feed on ambiguity and rhetoric.
That is the prime lesson from the International Joint Commission
experience, and one that seems generally applicable to many as yet
unsettled law of the sea differences between these unique neigh-
bors.
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APPENDIX I
IJC ACTUAL AND ANTICIPATED EXPENDITURES
1970-1977
Canadian Secretariat Great Lakes Regional Office
OTTA WA WINDSOR 2
Fiscal
Year Expenditures Man Years Expenditures Man Years
1970-71 499,000 11
1971-72 536,000 11
1972-73 451,000 12 4
1973-74 504,000 14 206,000 8
1974-75* 1 1,180,000 14 640,000 15
1975-76** 1,450,000 24 850,000 20
1976-77** 1,500,000 26 1,300,000 20
* Estimated
** Anticipated
* Included in Ottawa Secretariat budget
(1) This includes payments to the Government of Ontario for one-half the
costs of the work carried out by Ontario in direct support of the Commission's
Land Use Activities Reference and the Upper Lakes Pollution Reference.
(2) The costs of the Regional Office at Windsor, staffed by Canadian and
United States Public Servants, are shared equally between Canada and the
United States except for capital items (furniture and furnishings) which are paid
for and retained by Canada. Each Country pays and recruits its own officials.
The figures above represent salaries of Canadian professional and support staff
and the total operating costs which are initially paid from Canadian appropriations
and then are shared by the United States equally.
It is not possible to estimate approximate values of the services of other de-
partments which have been provided to the IJC during the same period, which
have run into millions of dollars. Much of the work performed by Departments
for the IJC consists of work required as well under ongoing Departmental pro-
grams.
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